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ABSTRACT 
We contest two claims: (1) that language, understood as the processing of 
abstract symbolic forms, is an instrument of cognition and rational thought, 
and (2) that conventional notions of turn-taking, exchange structure, and 
move analysis, are satisfactory as a basis for theorizing communication 
between living, feeling agents.  We offer an enkinaesthetic theory describing 
the reciprocal affective neuro-muscular dynamical flows and tensions of co-
agential dialogical sense-making relations. This “enkinaesthetic dialogue” is 
characterised by a preconceptual experientially recursive temporal dynamics 
forming the deep extended melodies of relationships in time. An 
understanding of how those relationships work, when we understand and are 
ourselves understood, when communication falters and conflict arises, will 
depend on a grasp of our enkinaesthetic intersubjectivity.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The feeling and sensing body has gained prominence in discussions of 
consciousness and experience in recent years  and, whilst we are generally 1
sympathetic with a great many ideas expressed in these discussions, they remain 
predominantly individual-centered and are only minimally interactivist in 
character. We take issue with this minimal interactivism. (Stuart, 2010b, 2012; 
Thibault, 2000). The authors who come closest to our own view, moving away, 
though not entirely, from the individual-centered view, are Gendlin (1992), Hodges 
(2007), Trevarthen (2012) and Noë (2004, 2009), but even they fall a little shy of 
the fully-affective relationally-embodied commitment we make in establishing the 
reciprocal enkinaesthetic dynamical flow that is lived affectively between agents.   
The moving, feeling, perceiving body is at the core of lived experience , but the 2
examination of a non-situated individuated sensory-kinaesthetics, with little 
consideration of the affectively-laden, emotional, interpersonal and interobjective 
world in which the agent finds itself, will only ever provide a partial account of the 
experiential whole.  
Organic agents move co-agentially and-co-affectively concerting with – though not 
necessarily in concert with – the movement and action of other agents and other 
things. They fold into, enfold with, and unfold from the lives of those agents and 
those things with which they necessarily co-exist,  for their world is characterised 3
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 See, for example, Merleau-Ponty (1962), Damasio (1994, 1999, 2003), Edelman (1992, 1
2006), Sheets-Johnstone (1999, 2000, 2003), Gallagher (2005), and others too numerous to 
mention.
 For a vigorous counter-example one might look at Goldman & De Vignemont (2009).2
 This is not to suggest that the particular things and agents with which we co-exist must 3
be  that particular set of agents and things; it would be ludicrous to deny the contingency 
and contingencies of our existence and co-existents. It is simply to assert that we would 
not exist as we do – both pre-reflectively and reflectively sensitive – without there being a 
countervailing environment. Ex hypothesi, other agents are the necessary obverse of 
reflective agents. 
by its transcendental intersubjectivity (Zahavi, 1997) and its transcendental 
enkinaesthesia (Stuart, 2010b).   
2. ENKINAESTHESIA: THE PRIMACY OF AFFECTIVE BEING-WITH 
Let’s begin with what we mean by ‘enkinaesthesia’ and why we emphasise the 
primacy of affectively interrelated agents over, apparently, autonomous individuals.  
‘Enkinaesthesia’ describes the co-affective feeling of the presence of other(s), 
agential (human, horse, cat, beetle) and non-agential (cup, bed, apple, paper). In 
this paper we are concerned specifically with the enkinaesthetic experiential 
entanglement of human being, but much of what we have to say, about the ways in 
which we affect and are affected by other organisms and objects, will be true for all 
organic agents. Enkinaesthetically we are able to understand ourselves within a 
community and reciprocity of being, where each action, already characterised by 
its givenness, engenders affect and that affect engenders action, not just within 
ourselves but within all life. Thus, it is through our enkinaesthetic entanglement 
that we create intercorporeal resonances with those agents with whom, and those 
objects with which, we are in reciprocal relations of perpetual community, within 
the experiential repertoire of the whole.   
So, the feeling of being is, by its nature, a feeling of being-with, and the capacity 
for enkinaesthetic dialogue is an a priori nomological condition for agency, for the 
creation of kinaesthetic melodies and for the generation of a felt anticipatory 
dynamics (Stuart, 2010b); with other agents this anticipatory dynamics will include 
the enkinaesthetically anticipated arc of their intentional action.  The ‘other’ can 
include sensing and experiencing agents and it is their affective intentional 
reciprocity which co-constitutes the experientially recursive temporal dynamics 
that characterize the formation and maintenance of the integral enkinaesthetic 
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structures which unite agents, even when those structures and that experience pulls 
them apart. This is not as paradoxical as may sound; it is merely to say that even 
distancing and fragmenting experience demonstrates the perpetual community and 
reciprocity of affective emotional relations. It is these affective emotional relations 
– these enkinaesthetic melodies – which emphasize the dialogical nature of the 
feeling of being as the feeling of being-with or being-among, and these dynamics 
establish, mediate, and sustain our moral and cultural ties (Stuart, 2010a, 2010b, 
2012; Thibault, 2011a, 2011b: pp. 103-113).  
An essential aspect of our claim is that these affectively-saturated encounters with 
others and the bonding which occurs lead to the discovery of thresholds of change 
in both the agent and the other. These thresholds are immanent within the agent’s 
lived body and are made salient by the body’s pre-reflective experience of the 
micro-temporal or pico-scale bodily-dynamics of one’s own and others’ 
kinaesthetic melodies. A threshold becomes known by the culturally variable 
interaction of those biological and cultural factors that reliably establish the 
conditions for the recursive entwinement of each other’s enkinaesthetic melodies; 
these can be understood as affective technologies of social learning and bonding.   4
In this way, enkinaesthetic dynamics build and sustain the melodies that bond 
individuals in the relations of reciprocity and community that shape and direct 
intentional structures. There is no conscious representation here, but rather a 
preconceptual, prereflexive givenness and co-presencing of the lived body with 
other lived bodies.  Such reciprocal, dialogically coordinated adjustments to each 
other’s dynamics actualize intentional structures – structures that point beyond 
themselves to the building of relationships and the coordination of tasks requiring 
cooperation. As agents’ melodies become enfolded with each other in an 
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 See also Kinsbourne, 20054
interwoven prosodic system of felt movements and intensities, a virtual field of 
learning emerges in which the culturally and biologically immanent thresholds are 
lived as the enkinaesthetic dialogue.  
As Deleuze (1994: p. 192) points out, this “propels us to those problems which 
demand the very transformation of our body and our language” (1994: p. 192). 
Such affect-laden encounters with others are always a becoming-with that is 
quintessentially proto-modal. Which is to say, they are always implicitly oriented 
to the evaluation and transformation of the agent’s current experience and feelings, 
such that social routine and habit give way to what Deleuze called “singular 
processes of learning” (Deleuze, 1994: p. 25). We might characterize these 
processes within the enkinaesthetic enfolding of agents’ melodies as the 
actualization of potentialities or virtual tendencies rather than the mere imitation of 
others. This capacity to affect and be affected always entails an individuating event 
– a hacceity in the Deleuzian ontology, where the individuation is impersonal and 
pre-individual – in which ‘one’  actively participates and is immersed, as distinct 5
from the objectifying and detached gaze of one who observes from the sidelines.   6
Thus the enkinaesthetic milieu extends beyond the individual to encompass the 
totality of affective, transformative kinetic relations. 
Luria (1973: p. 36) uses the term “kinetic melody” to point out that the formation 
and transformation of motor skills requires the skilful orchestrating and performing 
of many “complex movements” that are produced and “performed as a single 
‘kinetic melody’: “with the development of motor skills the individual impulses are 
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 ‘One’ for Deleuze is a “science fiction” derived from the simulation of identity 5
“produced as an ‘optical effect’ by the more profound game of difference and repetition” 
and the ‘nowhere’ which is the “displaced, modified and always recreated ‘here-and-
now’”. [1994: p. xix] 
 Under this conception, solipsism is inconceivable. See also Stuart, 2012.6
synthesized and combined into integral kinaesthetic structures or kinetic 
melodies” (Luria, 1973: p. 176; See also Luria, 1973: p. 32).  Luria (1964) speaks 7
of kinaesthetic structures as afference-related, and kinetic melodies as efference-
related, but it cannot be overlooked that the kinaesthetic is also an acting and the 
kinetic has also a felt muscular tonality, so, it is impossible to separate them in the 
experience of the dialogical lived body. Thus, together they establish the 
enkinaesthetic dialogically coordinated relational dynamics of what we are calling 
first-order languaging between agents (Stuart, 2012; Thibault, 2004a, 2011c).  
Enkinaesthesia is, therefore, intrinsically pre-reflexive and dialogically reciprocal. 
The kinetic melodies of one agent respond to, engage with, affect, and change the 
kinaesthetic melodies of other agents, and vice versa. 
Luria’s writing on kinaesthetic melodies echoes Merleau-Ponty’s earlier thinking 
that “internal articulation and as a kinetic melody gifted with a meaning [carries 
within itself] an immanent intelligibility” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). In our dialogical 
context, “internal articulation” refers to the pico-scale dynamics of whole-body 
inter- and intra-actional attunement and co-ordination. They are ‘articulations’, not 
just of musculo-skeletal systems, but of affectively-laden tonalities which underpin 
the formation, strengthening, fracturing, and breaking of social bonds and which, in 
their enkinaesthetic articulation, have their own emotional salience and 
intelligibility. This intelligibility is formed within the feelings of anticipation, of 
the sensed familiarity (which we might once have referred to as 'repetition', but true 
somato-sensory repetition is impossible) and sensed unfamiliarity (ongoing 
perpetual ‘change’ or ‘difference’), and most importantly, how these at once draw 
us back and propel us forward. One might think here of the notion of ‘width’ in the 
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  See also Stuart, 2006, 2007, 2008, & 2010a, and Sheets-Johnstone, 1990, 1999, 2000, 7
2003, & 2009, both of whom speak of the formation of nonlinguistic, corporeal concepts 
and kinaesthetic memories made possible through action and repetition.
“living-present” of Husserl’s phenomenological structure of time consciousness. 
The “living-present” extends beyond the now of the primal impression, into the 
retained just-past, and the protended yet-to-come, and, so, our temporal experience 
spreads out across time, and is not a matter of a single, discrete punctuated event. 
(Husserl, 1964; see particularly §11.) But this highlights only one significant  
element of the “always livingly present”; the other element is the processually 
recursive. 
Sensed familiarity has balance; its articulation is smooth, its intelligibility 
immanent, but it is never still, never quiet, and never discrete. Our living present is 
always co-livingly enkinaesthetically active; drawing us within ourselves and 
forward anticipatingly. There is, at one and the same time, a linear (explicit) order, 
a story we can tell, and an implicit forth-coming, but the coming-forth is only 
possible because this is a process of feedback into the already-changed and feed-
forward into the anticipating; and this is a perpetual process. We might express this 
as a recursive 'synchrony' of being-into-becoming. In our being is our becoming. 
Our being - never still, never quiet, never discrete - yields to our becoming which 
shapes and alters our being which yields to our becoming, and so the processual, 
recursive nature of our experience continues. We are, so to speak, immersed 
anticipatingly, recursively, becomingly, livingly, that is, enkinaesthetically, with our 
world. 
In this immersive anticipation we ask non-propositional sensuous questions about 
how our world will continue to be. We touch the seat to my left, look up to see our 
partner, or smell the air to catch the scent of dog roses. Our anticipated response 
may not be the forth-coming we expect, our equilibrium may be disrupted by a 
sensed unfamiliar with its accompanying kinetic tensions and dis-ease. This dis-
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ease with its tensions and tones seeks balance and attunement once more, even 
though that balance persists only within a transient always-differentiating recursive 
process. It is this, always-differentiating recursive enkinaesthetic process, which 
characterizes the emotional prosody of lived co-participatory sense-making. It is a 
process which defies being subordinated to the laws of classical probability 
(Kampis, 1991: p. 156) or the abstract formalisms of linguistics. It is a process we 
characterise as first-order languaging. 
3. FIRST-ORDER LANGUAGING AND ENKINAESTHETICS 
First-order languaging is, in part, the real-time co-participatory whole-body sense-
making (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007) that occurs between agents. First-order 
languaging is bio-mechanical coordination between agents and between agents and 
aspects of their worlds. In the case of persons, first-order languaging comes under 
second-order cultural-historical constraints, including the lexicogrammatical 
patterns of languages (Cowley, 2008, 2009; Love, 1990, 2004; Thibault, 2008, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c). But that is only in part. Second-order language refers to the 
formal abstracta (e.g., phonology, lexicogrammar, semantics) on different levels 
that are typically viewed as ‘language’ by linguists. Crucially, first-order 
languaging involves synchronized co-agential somato-sensory dynamics on very 
short, rapid time-scales of the order of fractions of seconds to milliseconds.  
Following previous work in this area (Cowley, 1998, 2009; Steffensen, Thibault & 
Cowley, 2010; Thibault ibid.), we shall refer to these very rapid temporal frames of 
the dynamical properties of communication as pico-scale bodily events. Persons in 
their co-participatory whole-body sense-making enact, exploit, respond to, and 
resonate with micro-temporal somato-sensory events in order to engage with others 
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and to co-construct their worlds. Building on enactivism, we might refer to this as 
‘co-enaction’, the experientially-entangled bringing forth of worlds (Stuart, 2012). 
First-order languaging is underpinned by enkinaesthetic activity; which is to say, it 
is dependent on the somato-sensory affective dynamics of agents co-enacting their 
worlds. We refer to these agents as ‘languaging agents’ who attune to plenisentient 
patterns in the ebbs and flows of energy of varying intensity and direction within 
each other’s action. In this way their bodily-dynamics, modulated by an 
affectively-saturated intentionality (Steinbock, 1999), have the functional capacity 
to move others – their feelings, emotions, perceptions, cognitions, and actions – in 
ways shaped also by cultural values, norms and experiential histories.  
Patterns of bodily-dynamics are variable and are neither completely regular nor 
completely predictable. They are grounded in pico-scale bodily events, including 
vocalizations, facial expressions, gestures, eye gaze, posture, and muscular 
tensions. These processes have their developmental basis in the co-regulation of 
affect in the dialogically-coordinated modes of physiobiological regulation and 
adaptation that characterize mother-infant dyads in primary intersubjectivity 
(Bråten, 1992, 2007; Cowley et al, 2004; Trevarthen, 1979, 1998), but also in utero 
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(Stuart, 2012).   It is this whole-body inter- and intra-actional adaptation that 8
Maturana refers to as ‘languaging’:  
To language is to interact structurally. Language takes place in the domain 
of relations between organisms in the recursion of consensual coordinations 
of actions, but at the same time language takes place through structural 
interactions in the domain of the bodyhoods of the languaging organisms. 
As the body changes, languaging changes; and as languaging changes the 
body changes.  
(Maturana, 1988: §9.5) 
The consensual domain that Maturana writes about has the following essential 
features: (1) the reciprocal, ‘causal’  nature of body dynamics manifest in the co-9
synchronization of the dynamical states of the two (or more) agents; and (2) the 
overlap of the consensual domains of the two agents, which is grounded in co-
!11
 One might think, erroneously, that we’re suggesting a version of Vygotsky’s non-8
individuated ‘great-we’ consciousness: “the infant's solipsistic behavior is actually social 
behavior characteristic of the infant's “great-we” consciousness” [Vygotsky, 1998: p. 241] 
because “for the infant, the center of every object situation is another person who changes 
its significance and sense ... and ... the relation to the object and the relation to the person 
have not yet been separated in the infant” [ibid. p. 235]. It’s wonderful work, but 
enkinaesthetic phenomenology is much more than this. We agree, unequivocally, that the 
givenness of the infant’s own experience is never experienced in isolation from the 
givenness of the other, but it doesn’t develop at birth and exist as something to be 
overcome with learning.  Experience, pre- and postnatally, is never in isolation, not just 
from the other as object or agent but from the environmental background as a whole. 
Experience “begins with the motor enquiry of backgrounded dispositions which develop 
corporeal capacities like the proprioceptive ‘material me’ (Sherrington, 1906) and the 
tactile senses through afference and re-afference (feedback) which confirm the sensory 
effects of moving. So, even in utero the infant begins to establish bodily habits and 
expectations which gradually slide, apparently unnoticed, over a period of approximately 
eighteen to twenty-four months, into the background, as the post-natal infant’s 
prelinguistic experience comes to an end. It is this pre-natal experience which makes it 
possible for the new born to engage in an enkinaesthetic dialogical intimacy so soon after 
birth [because it] comes already equipped with a repertoire of actions” [Stuart, 2012 ]. The 
social and cultural necessity of separating ourselves as ‘individuals’ from agents and things 
is not an experiential possibility; enkinaesthesia remains a condition of life and the living 
present.
 Our use of single quotes around ‘causal’ indicates that common notions of causal 9
relations are not adequate for explaining the nature of enkinaesthetic dynamics. There is no 
simple, unilinear cause-effect relation in these dynamics. The traditional use of ‘causal’ 
only highlights the paucity of explanation it provides.
affectivity. Gradually this overlap leads to the co-creation of shared feeling states 
and co-affective interactional stances in such a way that agents, spontaneously and 
pre-conceptually, co-orient within a group or culture. Enkinaesthetic co-affectivity 
is, thus, fundamental to the formation of the consensual domain because of its 
primary orientational function, and necessary for the ontogenesis of the respective 
agents.  
Taking just one from a wealth of possible examples: 
Malloch’s theory of communicative musicality (Malloch, 1999, Malloch & 
Trevarthen, 2009) – derived from microanalysis of a proto-conversation 
between a six-week-old girl and her mother ... – details the expressive 
parameters that enable the infant, with the support of her mother’s 
affectionate sensibility, to find intersubjective harmony of purpose. They 
compose a melodic story together by sharing the pulse, quality, and 
narrative of their expressive sounds and movements. Gratier has applied 
similar analysis to vocal dialogues between mothers and infants across 
cultures, with different states of sensitivity or security in intimacy. She 
shows how, in a thriving relationship, mother and infant discover a ‘proto-
habitus’, or shared world of meanings, as conventions of expression 
invented in their play (Gratier & Trevarthen, 2007, 2008; Gratier & Apter-
Danon, 2009) [Trevarthen, 2012, pp. 30-31]. 
Responses are considered consensual because the bodily dynamics, and 
concomitant feelings and interactional stance of an agent, modify and direct the 
response of the other by co-orienting the other to some aspect of their shared 
world. This is what we mean by proto-modality: that which entails the taking up of 
perspectives which are relatable to a proto-self (Damasio,1999); in other words, a 
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system of pre-conceptual felt-evaluations through which the agent constrains and 
regulates their entwined and reciprocal affective neuro-muscular dynamics.  
Hodges (2007) and Hodges & Baron (2007) refer to this process as ‘values-
realizing’, to characterize the proto-modal co-explorative evaluations that, whilst 
implicit and pre-conceptual, provide a pragmatic means for expressing the focus of 
our practical shared concerns.   10
For example, in hearing and feeling our interlocutor as 'angry' we are responding to 
and evaluating the pico-scale dynamics of their vocal, facial, muscular, orientation, 
and other bodily-dynamics in ways that are functional in the homeostatic regulation 
of individuals and communities (Damasio, 2005). What we construe, for instance, 
as negative feeling ‘states’ are, in actual fact, somatory-sensory emotional 
dynamics that are associated with actions and values which are potentially or 
actually harmful to the organism. Inefficient regulatory states (Damasio, 2005: p. 
48), lack of coordination, disharmony and discord are associated with negative 
feeling states. On the other hand, positive feeling states are associated with 
efficient, life-enhancing processes that maintain the organism and its world in a 
state of harmony, coordination, and concord. 
As previously mentioned enkinaesthetic melodies can be characterized as 
technologies “for bonding in groups” (Freeman, 1995: p. 134); indeed, it may be 
the precursor technology to all the other major technological revolutions: 
The major technological revolutions in cultural evolution are commonly 
listed as tool making, agriculture, and manufacturing, each entailing a 
geometric spurt in population growth. Before them all, perhaps, emerged the 
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 The reciprocal and interleaved experience and feeling of this flow can be understood as 10
analogous in significant ways to our experience of melody and prosody in music and in 
conversation. See Thibault, 2005: pp. 321-323, for a longer discussion of proto-modality.
technology for bonding in groups, since making tools, fires and shelters 
required cooperation among brains. 
(Freeman, 1995: p. 135) 
Given this, it is fair to say that enkinaesthetic melodies create affective trusting 
bonds. The implicit enkinaesthetic intricacy through which such bonds are formed 
may have led to the socialization of intentional structures through processes of 
“repeated unlearning” and the emergence of group identities; after all, the 
emergence of group identities provides resources for the focusing and modulation 
of the intentional structures required for cooperation between individuals in groups. 
Our own use of the term ‘recursion’ echoes Maturana’s as a means of emphasising 
the bi-directional dynamics of the coordinations between languaging agents, and, 
as we have shown, experientially recursion implicates both the historical or 
retentive dimension and the anticipatory or protentive dimension of the affective 
action trajectories of dialogically co-ordinated agents (Thibault, 2005). This is true 
in both the long-term and the short, pico-scale, term of events. The melodies that 
are grounded in our somato-sensory experience, like all forms of melody (music, 
speech, dance, and movement) are experienced as a temporally indivisible flow 
that has distinctive affective qualities; so, the melody feels ‘smooth’, ‘complete’, 
‘sad’, ‘joyful’, ‘sombre’, ‘uplifting’, and so on.   This modulation of each other's 
rhythms and responses involves, in the case of each body, an implicit intricacy 
(Gendlin, 1992): 
There is an implicit interactional bodily intricacy that is first – and still with 
us now. It is not the body of perception that is elaborated by language, rather 
it is the body of interactional living in its environment. Language elaborates 
how the body implies its situation and its next behavior. We sense our bodies 
!14
not as elaborated perceptions but as the body sense of our situations, the 
interactional whole-body by which we orient and know what we are doing. 
(Gendlin, 1992: p. 353) 
Although he doesn’t use the same terminology, Gendlin is distinguishing between 
first-order languaging and second-order language; his presentation of his work 
here, however, concentrates on the individual intra-bodily experience and not on an 
implicit inter-bodily affective intricacy between agents. We characterize this 
intricacy as co-ordinating polyphonic enkinaesthetic activity, where ‘polyphonic’ 
refers to the plenisentient modulation of agents’ co-enactions. Polyphony in this 
context cannot be created by an isolated, individuated single agent. This is not to 
deny the internal enkinaesthetics of the agent, it is simply to proclaim the 
impossibility of a causally-closed system. “[E]xperiencing is inherently an 
interaction process in a situation with other people and things. What appears is 
neither internal nor external, neither just private nor just interactional.” (Gendlin, 
2004, p. 147)  Crucially Gendlin (2012) goes further and stresses the identity of the 
autopoietic organism with its environmental interaction: “An organism is an 
environmental interaction that continuously regenerates itself.”. The environment is 
immanent for the organism in such a way that the organism is immersed 
anticipatingly, recursively, becomingly, livingly, one might say, enkinaesthetically 
and co-enactingly with its world. 
Thus, in an entirely pre-conceptual way, the enkinaesthetic melodies of one agent 
must refer, simultaneously, to themselves and to those of others. Enkinaesthetic 
relations constitute a reflexive domain in which the kinetic melodies of agents’ 
first-order languaging both constitute the domain and have the potential to act on 
and transform the domain. (We have seen this already fleshed out in the notion of 
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recursion and will return to it later as ‘structural drift’.) For example, the melody of 
one agent may become explicitly entwined with that of another agent and give rise 
to a new kind of attunement that is quite different from their former melodies. 
Think of two people coming in to the centre of the floor to dance. Previously they 
have been talking with friends at the side of the room.  In that interaction, their 
conversation and their feeling bodies have their own emotions, pitches, cadences, 
kinetics and proprioceptive dynamics.  The enkinaesthetic polyphony of that 
languaging succeeds because it anticipates and adapts as they come together to 
dance. There are rhythms in the music, and there are kinetic rhythms, tones, and 
pico-scale bodily events all of which are felt and affective. What we might once 
have thought of as their ‘individual’  kinetic melodies can resonate in a pre-11
reflective attunement, and they can sometimes conflict and fragment. In either case 
this languaging is not reducible to formal (e.g., verbal or other symbolic) patterns 
(Thibault, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). It is something much more heterogeneous than 
verbal or textual interchange, or what might be referred to as ‘second-order 
language’ or second-order cultural constructs (Love, 1990, 2004; Thibault, 2008, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Languaging in this context is comprised of a heterogeneity 
of factors – neural, somato-sensory, emotional, social, and cultural – that are 
distributed across a diversity of timescales. According to Cowley et al.:  
Language is distributed. Given radical heterogeneity, it spreads across bodies 
in time, and space. It is merely constrained by the 'languages' which the 
centralist invokes to explain acts of utterance and interpretations. Thus we 
prioritize dialogue and how humans behave. What we do is based in 
biomechanical co-ordination. This is first-order language or languaging. In a 
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 ‘Individual’ is in inverted commas because we dwell in an enkinaesthetic co-existence 11
from our experiential beginnings to our experiential end. Thus, we agree that ‘individual’ is  
a Deleuzean ‘science fiction’.
biocultural world, we hypothesize, languaging enables biological individuals 
(babies) to self-organize as persons. (http://www.psy.herts.ac.uk/dlg/) 
This ‘dialogue’ need not be linguistic, though it can be. It will be apparent to the 
reader that we do not imply textual, linguistic, or discursive activity, only the 
enkinaesthetic interactivity of agents within the domain of ‘first-order languaging’. 
Cowley puts this well when he says:  
As living beings, we do not encode/decode but, rather, concert our doings 
such that our activity becomes entangled with second-order constructs. In 
similar vein, Wittgenstein [1958] sees that language is inseparable from what 
we do or our forms of life. Our forms of life give us many kinds of first-order 
language.  
(Cowley, 2009: p. 500).  
Thus, linguistic interplay is not ruled out, but our main concern has been with the 
proto-modal, prelinguistic, and pre-reflective enkinaesthetically generated co-
enactions of agents. To bring this out further we now provide a brief consideration 
of the neglect of the feeling dimension in current accounts of language. 
4. THE LANGUAGING OF LIVING AGENTS 
Language and emotions have been on the official agenda for some time now in 
linguistics and discourse analysis (Besnier, 1990; Colombetti, 2009). Nevertheless, 
researchers in these areas have a tendency to see emotions and affect as second-
order semantic constructs of their lexico-grammatical realizations or encodings.   12
Bodily feelings, the feelings people have, how they move others to feel through 
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 See, for example, Martin and White, 2005; and Thibault, 2005: pp. 288-299, for an 12
alternative explanation.
dialogically coordinated somato-sensory dynamics, and how they too are moved to 
feel in dialogically coordinated languaging, are all but ignored. This stance 
contrasts with the fact that people, in languaging, not only hear, see, and smell the 
other's somato-sensory dynamics, they also feel them at all scalar levels of the 
organism (Thibault, 2011b: pp. 127-136). The fact that the feeling dimension of 
languaging has been ignored or suppressed for so long no doubt stems, at least in 
part, from the Saussurean legacy in twentieth century linguistics. In that tradition 
and its various historical developments, the biplanar architecture of language has 
been seen as a coding relationship between two abstracta – the acoustic image and 
the concept, which were conceived by Saussure as mental, not physical, entities 
that are correlated in the formation of linguistic signs (Saussure, 1910-1911/1993: 
pp. 285-290).  
And yet, languaging is somato-sensory activity: it has a physical and sensorial 
existence. In much languaging, how people feel or are moved to feel by another's 
languaging – for example, the soothing, caring words a parent utters to comfort a 
child – are frequently more salient than what is said. Languaging is part of what it 
means to be a feeling, animate agent living in relations of community and 
reciprocity with other agents. In their languaging, agents are immersed in the 
reciprocal flow of bodily feelings and sensations. The question then is to 
understand what these bodily feelings are and how they are integrated with other 
aspects of languaging.  Languaging catalyzes flows of bodily feelings between co-
acting agents in dialogical communion with one-another, and we need to ask how it 
is that these flows move and constrain people to feel, think, and act (Thibault, 
2011a, 2011b; Verbrugge, 1985); how can someone's utterance activity move 
someone else to feel increased muscle tension, increased heart rate, or to feel that 
another’s voice is calm and reassuring. 
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One of the most striking things about this shift in focus is that we can abandon the 
misleading idea of turn-taking as the basis for the organization of dialogical 
relations in whole-body sense-making, and this will be done with reference, first of 
all, to the affective balance achieved through the Husserlian notion of analogizing 
apprehension: 
If we attempt to indicate the peculiar nature of that analogizing apprehension 
whereby a body within my primordial sphere, being similar to my own 
animate body, becomes apprehended as likewise an animate organism, we 
encounter: first, the circumstance that here the primally institutive original is 
always livingly present, and the primal instituting itself is therefore always 
going on in a livingly effective manner ... 
On more precise analysis we find essentially present here an intentional 
overreaching, ... a living mutual awakening and an overlaying of each with 
the objective sense of the other.   
(Husserl 1960, §51, ‘Fifth Cartesian Meditation’, pp.112-113) 
In our livingly present intentional overreaching, we embody agential enkinaesthetic 
co-existence in a way that is more than simply a structural coupling. In our first-
order languaging, we live, we experience, the mutual overlaying of the other in us 
and we in them; routinely we spill over into the experiential life of the other. 
(Stuart, 2010b) The individual’s implicit intricacy should now be conceived more 
naturally as an implicit inter-bodily, inter-worldly enkinaesthetic intricacy which is 
livingly present continuously within agential first-order languaging.  
If this is true, the emphasis on turn-taking and moves in conversation- and 
discourse-analytical approaches which view linguistic dialogue as the executing of 
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rules based on pre-existing procedures, programs or codes (e.g., rules of 
sequencing), is quite simply wrong-headed. Under that conception, language 
behaviour is predictable and recoverable / deducible from prior codes or programs. 
There is no place for the enkinaesthetics of experience, spontaneity, creativity, 
imagination, anticipation, serendipity, and history. Yet we know that living beings 
are not like this, they are not reducible to machine-like formal regularities or 
programs. They feel and live, necessarily co-participating in affective, values-
realizing, meaningful flows of activity with other feeling and living bodies. Their 
entwined somato-sensory dynamics form feeling bonds between persons and 
between persons and other agents and things.  
5.  FIRST-ORDER LANGUAGING, EMOTION INDUCERS AND FEELINGS 
AS EVALUATORS 
First-order languaging dynamics are never neutral. Their prosodies are always 
active, enkinaesthetically dynamic, evaluative and stance-taking, struggling both 
with the asymmetries of agents’ relations as well as with the disruptive forces of 
their feeling and visceral states. These affective dynamics have the functional 
capacity to orient agents around values-realizing action and (implicit) evaluation. 
Damasio discusses the values-realizing dimension of bodily feelings: 
The levers of homeostasis are defined by conditions that conscious and 
reflective humans can easily describe as states of pain and punishment, at one 
end of the spectrum, or pleasure and reward at the other. What we label as 
pain and pleasure is, in effect, the experience of particular configurations of 
the physiological state characterized by certain chemical parameters of the 
internal milieu, by the smooth muscle tone of viscera, by behaviors enacted 
in the musculoskeletal system, and by the distribution of neuromodulators in 
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neural tissue. States of pain and punishment, if maintained over long periods 
of time without counteraction, lead to disease and death; states of pleasure 
and reward lead to health and well-being. 
(Damasio, 2005: p. 48) 
The pico-scale dynamics of first-order languaging have the potential to prompt or 
co-enact evaluations as part of the co-agential dynamic, thus, feeling and otherwise 
perceiving the speaker’s voice as ‘angry’, ‘unfriendly’, ‘sincere’, ‘caring’, and so 
on. These terms are, of course, no more than lexico-semantic labels or glosses, but 
they get at an important aspect of the process: agents interpret bodily feelings in 
qualitatively distinct, value-laden, and value-driven ways. This is not to say that a 
given linguistic term correlates in any simple or direct way with a particular 
syndrome of bodily sensations and associated feelings; it does not. However, it 
does show that these terms provide a means of making emotions and feelings 
enkinaesthetically salient, and at the same time recognizing that talking about 
them, using second-order lexico-semantic categories, may also be a way of 
transforming them.  13
Modulations in the somato-sensory dynamics of vocalizing and other gestural 
activities can function as an “inducer of emotion” (Damasio, 1999: p. 68). So, 
speaking only of the voice: the micro-temporal dynamics of a ‘loud’ or ‘aggressive’ 
voice, for instance, is such an inducer of a bodily feeling and the concomitant 
emotion. The designation of someone’s voice as ‘loud’, ‘angry’, ‘friendly’, 
‘beckoning’, ‘caressing’, and so on, is a felt, enkineasthetic pre-reflexive and 
prenoetic immersive response.  
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 This is possibly the earliest form of natural hermeneutics.13
A number of things happen here: (i) the hearer feels the physical impact of the 
speaker’s voice on her receptor organs – the ear, the skin, and so on. Vocal tract 
events impact on and affect the whole body, including the inducement of tactile 
sensations (Gick and Derrick, 2009); (ii) the hearer is plenisentially aware of the 
speaker’s voice as information about an environmental event, namely, the speaker’s 
location and proximity, so things external to the listener in the environment ‘out 
there’; (iii) the hearer’s brain – specifically the cortical patterns that are activated in 
the cerebrum – creates some kind of internal construction or model of the external 
object of perception (Damasio, 2003: p. 91; Kinsbourne, 2005).  
The threefold distinction made here with help from Damasio shows that the 
prosodic relation between agents is more than the perception of an external 
environmental event and its characteristics. It is also the direct perception of 
feeling states about the external objects that occur within the enkinaesthetic milieu 
of the agent. The capacity to coordinate the affective co-sensitivity within first-
order languaging, through the use of vocal and other somato-sensory dynamics, 
provides a basis for grasping of others’ intentions. The language sciences have paid 
considerable attention to the characteristics of speech events, seen as external 
objects of attention and perception, but very little has been written about this 
crucial aspect of the way vocal events are perceived, felt, embodied, evaluated and 
understood by listeners.  
In face-to-face dialogical coordination each person attempts to synchronize their 
body movements and muscle tensions with the movements and muscle tensions of 
others. Oscillating neurons (oscillators) are zeroed by external stimuli such as the 
movement of another person (Hart, 2008: p. 83). In this way, one person’s neural 
and bodily dynamics can become synchronized with another person’s during time-
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locked dialogical interaction (Hart ibid.; Thibault, 2011c). The firing of neural 
oscillators binds affective input in time in patterns of neural activation. The time-
locked patterns of activation of oscillating neurons play a crucial role in the 
perceptual and motor activities that are central to real-time languaging behaviour. 
When this occurs, that is, when a resonance pattern is created between two or more 
individuals in this way, they form a coupled system consisting of emergent neural 
and somato-sensory dynamics that are truly immersive in character and function.  14
In this coupling, the affectively-laden tonalities of each agent’s experience provide 
a way of organizing a response, where the tonalities act as evaluators (Damasio, 
1999, 2003, 2005). So, for example, we feel the speaker’s voice to be angry and 
directed towards us; this interpretative stance is concomitant with the kinaesthetic 
responses of our body, its tensed muscles, racing heart, intensified rate of 
breathing, blushing, and so on (Thibault, 2004b: pp. 94-98). But these are also 
enmeshed and entangled enkinaesthetic languagings, part of an active, dialogically 
organized social response to the speaker’s anger. The dis-ease we feel and 
concomitant implicit negative evaluation engenders a means of modulating and 
guiding our responses. These evaluations in general enable us to learn how to 
modulate and adapt our responses to better understand, anticipate, and cope with 
what we hear and feel. Naturally, this can lead to more successful dealings with 
others and more effective ways of tracking and gauging their emotional and 
intentional orientations. The adaptive nature of such responses fits well with the 
enactivist account of perception advanced by Noë (2004); the active, 
enkinaesthetically dynamic, evaluative languaging prosodies of exploring and 
acting on the world that are mediated by knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies, 
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 Edelman (1987, 1992, 2006) shows that emergent neural patterns of activation arising 14
from recurrent reentrant pathways are the result of the organism’s experience and ongoing 
activity; recurrent reentrant pathways are maintained and strengthened through the 
repetition of experience.
that is, practical knowledge concerning the changes caused by the agent’s 
perceptual exploration of agents, things and events, and in particular other persons.  
So, enkinaesthetically co-active agents constitute a source of perturbation for each 
other; the internal dynamics of one agent or organism being perturbed by the felt, 
affective internal dynamics of the other, and vice versa. As Maturana and Varela 
(1987/1992: p. 180) point out, such perturbations may arise from non-biotic as well 
as biotic sources. In biotic sources the interactions may acquire, in the course of 
their ontogeny, a recurrent nature, the necessary consequence of which is an 
intentionally-modulated structural drift.  When this happens, the co-drifting 15
organisms give rise to a new phenomenological domain, which is likely to become 
particularly complex when there is a nervous system. (1987/1992: pp. 180-181]. 
Maturana and Varela use the term “third-order coupling” (1987/1992: p. 181) to 
designate this new phenomenological domain:  
In fact, once organisms take part in recurrent interactions, these couplings will 
occur with definite complexity and stability, but as a natural result of the 
congruence of their respective ontogenetic drifts. 
(Maturana and Varela, 1987/1992: p. 181) 
As agents’ enkinaesthetic melodies co-adapt in first-order languaging, the 
resonance patterns enable co-participation in each other’s experience and sense-
making (see also Hart, 2008: pp. 83-84). These experiencing agents cannot then 
return to their former state prior to their mutual co-affect; that is the nature of an 
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 “[T]the life history of a living system courses as a spontaneous flow of continuous 15
structural changes that follow a path or course in which the living system conserves 
autopoiesis and adaptation in its domain of existence. I call this process ontogenic 
structural drift. We biologists do not easily see that the conservation of adaptation is an 
invariant relation that constitutes a condition of existence for living systems (and in fact 
for all systems), and this is so because we usually treat it as a variable in the evolutionary 
discourse.” [Maturana, 2002: p. 17]
always-differentiating recursive enkinaesthetic process.  Coordinated languaging 
behaviour biases and shapes attention and perception because it is shaped and 
directed by value biases intrinsic to its dynamics. Acculturated persons develop, in 
concert with others, strategic signaling behaviours that enable them to jointly 
attend to the world in values-realizing and socially coordinated ways.  Thus, the 
pico-scale dynamical patterns of first-order enkinaesthetic languaging affect others 
and are affected by them in ways that are shaped and guided by implicit (somato-
sensory) and explicit (social and cultural) values. 
6.  LINGUISTICS AND LANGUAGING 
Linguists and discourse analysts frequently write about ‘speaking’ and ‘listening’ 
activities and roles of languaging agents in ‘spoken discourse’.  The distinction that 
Gibson (1979/1986) and Reed (1996: pp. 80-82) make between exploratory and 
performatory activity is useful here. Exploratory activity is the scanning and 
making use of environmental information; performatory activity serves to regulate 
the organism’s own pattern of activity (Reed, 1996: p. 80). But, we would rather 
say that speakers and listeners engage in experientially synchronous co-exploratory 
and co-performatory acts during languaging. We accept Gibson’s and Reed’s 
distinction in principle, but not in practice. Moreover, performance is also always 
exploration, exploration is always performance.  Vocal tract gestures and other 
movements of speakers are not only performatory activities that regulate one’s own 
and others’ activity, they are also exploratory activities that elicit responses and 
provide information about the other and the other’s evaluative orientation. 
Listening is only one form of active, attentive exploratory activity; as we have 
seen, an agent’s languaging exploration is enkinaesthetically articulate and 
affectively co-immersive.  
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The bodily rhythms of persons and the dynamics of their vocal and related bodily 
activities may be synchronized, partially or fully, on the pico-scale of fractions of 
seconds and milliseconds whereby they are synchronized around shared variables 
such as speech and other body rhythms, pitch, tempo, timing and voice dynamics. 
Rhythm on different time-scales – neuronal, bodily, interpersonal, societal, natural 
– is a resource for organizing time and information/meaning on many different 
scales that are fundamental for the operation of action, perception, cognition, and 
semiosis in the course of the agent’s engagements with its world (Lefèbvre, 
1992/2004). As Cowley (1998) has shown in a study of the interpersonal 
significance of prosodies in Italian conversation, speakers adapt to each other's 
pitch and rhythm. Speakers synchronize with each other on the pico-scale of their 
voice and other bodily dynamics; they resonate with each other in always 
oscillating, always variable and never entirely stable patterns of rhythmic, 
harmonic, and other forms of convergence. It is through the possibility for such 
convergence that aspects of each other's feelings and experiences become enfolded 
into the bodily, neuronal, and affective dynamics of the other. 
Analysts such as Condon and Sander (e.g., 1974) have shown in detail the role of 
micro-temporal processes such as rhythm in the synchronization and coordination 
of agents-in-interaction. These researchers have demonstrated the emergent, co-
constructed and inter-individual properties of the neuromuscular dynamics of 
agents-in-interaction. What is missing is the further recognition that these and other 
aspects of pico-scale events are directly involved in sense-making and are, 
therefore, normative and values-realizing. In committing ourselves to a process 
ontology, we argue that our approach is better placed to understand and re-present 
the emergence of preconceptual sense-making and interpretation. If the physical 
‘medium’ of co-articulated vocal tract gestural activity, and so on, really were no 
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more than the passive embodiment of’ language’, then we would have no basis for 
explaining the causal role of neuromuscular dynamical flows in the construction of 
sense-making events in the lives of co-enacting agents.  Real-time somato-sensory 
dynamics of agents in always-differentiating recursive enkinaesthetic processes do 
not passively encode or embody information ‘about’ something; it is not a passive 
record of past states (Kampis, 1991: p. 436; Thibault, 2005).  
Typically, ‘language’ has been associated with higher cognitive, semantic and 
conceptual abilities, and ‘body language’ has been associated with feeling and 
expression where it is assumed that the ‘ascent’ to language is a progression from 
the one to the other (Thibault, 2008: pp. 301-309). The reciprocal affective neuro-
muscular dynamical flows and muscle tensions that are felt and enfolded between 
co-participating agents in exploratory sense-making activity have evolved precisely 
as a means of coordinating feeling and affect between persons, and no less so than 
higher-order thinking or reasoning of the kind we associate with conceptual and 
representational semantics (Bouissac, 2006; Sarles, 1977). The connection between 
the two perspectives is co-action and co-affect. Abercrombie has, for example, 
written of the “phonetic empathy” (1967: p. 97) that is reciprocally felt by 
participants in spoken dialogue. But such empathy hasn’t only to do with speech 
and hearing. Such empathy occurs on the basis of agents’ phenomenologically 
primitive enkinaesthetic entanglement and dispositions to mutual attunement; yes, 
of course it is to the rhythms of their vocalizing, but it is also to the implicit 
intricacy of their preconceptual dialogically entangled somato-sensory dynamics.   
7. CONCLUSION 
First-order languagings have an integral co-immersive affective character, 
occurring within an always-differentiating recursive process. We have shown how 
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the enkinaesthetic nature of languaging is reciprocally and plenisentially affective 
in a complex co-immersive, dialogical way, and have emphasised its recursive 
nature, without which pre-reflective, preconceptual experience would have no 
significance for the agent. Without this, the semiotic explosion, in which the child 
develops the ability to understand pictures, models, and other representational 
artifacts, could not occur.  
The view of language as a code-like input/output machine for processing abstract 
symbolic forms has been massively biased towards the idea that language is an 
instrument of cognition and rational thought. We oppose this view: it trivializes the 
importance of the reciprocal affective neuro-muscular flows and muscle tensions 
that are felt and enfolded as, co-exploratory and co-performative, enkinaesthetic 
melodies between co-participating agents in their anticipatingly-living experience.  
And so, to speak of words, as second-order language, having the power to touch 
and change a person, and thus to function as biodynamical social engines (Thibault, 
2011a: pp. 57-59), makes sense only if there is an already fully-operating 
biodynamical affective system primed to respond to the evocation of the words and 
the rise and fall of tensions in the vocal tract, and this, we are claiming, is there ab 
initio in the polyphonic enkinaesthetic dialogue of affectively entangled bodies. 
!
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